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Abstract

No Future for Academic Crips attempts to situate crip theory, critical disability studies, and
communication theory squarely in the context of academia, problematizing the constraints placed
on autistic identity by the demands of a graduate education. Utilizing autoethnographic vignettes
along with theoretical writings regarding the creation and consolidation of crip identity, this
thesis theorizes what a “neuroqueer future” looks like for academics. Six vignettes are presented
to demonstrate strategies for survival employed in academic spaces, followed by analysis
contextualizing and criticizing those strategies. Finally, implications for neuroqueer futurity and
identity are discussed.

Author’s Note: This thesis utilizes “disablism” instead of “ableism” as the term for anti-disabled
oppression, refocusing the center of disablist oppression onto the marginalized, rather than
“normal” abled bodies. Besides recentering disabled folks as the target of disablism, the general
meaning remains the same as “ableism.” Cited sources that use “ableism” retain their cited use.
In addition, this paper utilizes “autistics'' as the preferred term of choice to refer to individuals on
the autism spectrum, unless directed by literature not to. Such reference establishes autism and
disability writ large in the realm of identity in the same fashion as race, gender, or nationality.
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Chapter One: Introduction
It is November, and the end of the semester is in sight. Sitting in the back of a chilly
classroom, I try to grit my teeth and survive another lecture that seems straight from the 1990s.
Another video plays, and the virtue of the (allegedly misinformed) scholar goes unquestioned.
The audio is loud. It is too loud. I can’t hear anything. The professor stops the video to consider a
question. When the video begins again, it remains too loud. It’s taken on a shrill quality. I pull
the hood of my sweater over my head and try to put my head down on the desk. There is too
much going on in here. I need there to be less happening. Fewer voices. Less noise. The
professor needs to stop writing on the board while the video plays. I need to get out of here. A
classmate notices and asks if I am okay. I am not.
After class, the professor asks what happened. I explain that I am autistic and the sensory
experience of having an unnecessarily loud video along with trying to track both her writing and
the video set off an adverse reaction. The professor insists that she could not have known, and
that I don’t “look autistic.” I do not respond and leave. Later she will send me an email
admonishing me for being rude.
Being disabled in academia, for me, is a constant process of disclosure. Existing in a
space that does not respect visible disability, let alone invisible disability, requires the constant
performance of either passing or visible disability in order to survive. From professors constantly
parroting that they “couldn’t tell” that I am autistic, or contending with a never-ending barrage of
“I didn’t think of that” whenever neurodivergence is brought up in a pedagogical setting, I am
constantly othered for simply attempting to exist in a space clearly not built for me. In that sense,
it becomes necessary to document and understand my own performance of otherness, and how it
fits into a larger body rhetoric of disability. Existing methods commonly employed by instructors

2
to understand disability are not only unhelpful, but actively harmful (Seidler, 2011), as
instructors resort to simulation of disability to generate some kind of sympathy from abled
students and observers, who walk away with an “understanding” of how bad disabled folks have
it. Alternatively, abled observers may watch shows like Everything’s Gonna Be Okay, and use
disabled characters to “relate” more to the disabled experience, as if there is something to relate
to that can be accessed by an abled body.
In constructing a performance of disability, those who are labeled as “crippled” by
outside actors need to be able to navigate a world not designed for them. Being Black, this
happens on multiple axes, as disorder is generated not just through being autistic, but also
through Blackness in a white supremacist culture. I find myself often in the unenviable position
of needing to defend myself from disablist oppression and white supremacist racism, while also
needing to manage the fact that autism is a largely invisible disability compiled upon a
hypervisible Othering through Blackness. Each anecdote in this paper is faithfully recreated to
the best of my memory, including sensory experiences where they are relevant to the narrative
being established. To echo Garland-Thomson (2017) once again, narrative allows for a more
complete self-identification, which reinforces resistance to eugenic logics. In this paper, two
narratives will be presented, each followed with a reflection of how I regard/ed my actions and
responses to the moment. Doing so allows for, at least, an image of what crip identity means to
this one subject, in relation to the world around them.
To approach an anti-disablist future for myself and myself only, this thesis attempts to
situate moments of disabled performance within a context of disability activism, cripple
rhetorics, critical race theory and crip futurism. At the beginning of each section are vignettes,
recreated from memory of moments within my own experience being recognized as disordered
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during my time in academia. Rather than theorizing a universal autistic positionality, this thesis
attempts to explore my own political/crippled position, situating my performance as a result of
my relationship with my body, mind, and environment in order to create “an academic cripple”
Ultimately, my work here is in service to interrogate the research question: What constitutes a
future for this disabled academic?
Preview of Chapters
In Chapter 1, I will introduce the topic and methods, while generating the problem
statement and research questions. In Chapter 2, relevant literature will be reviewed situating this
reflection in existing literature on crip justice, critical race theory, performativity, and autistic
identity. Chapter three will be a review of the methodology, justifying autoethnography, along
with explaining the structure of self-reflection in the thesis. In Chapter 4, I will interrogate
moments of explicit Othering as it applies to a crip context. Upon examining three anecdotes
outlining occurrences of being Othered, implications for the construction of crip futures will be
discussed. In the 5th chapter, I will undergo interrogation of “passing” as it relates to ability.
Implications will be discussed after confronting three anecdotes in which the concept justifies or
contextualizes my actions or responses to circumstances. In the final chapter, theoretical
implications will be discussed, including a return to the larger problem statement. Limitations
and further avenues will be discussed before a larger focus on what ways in which projects like
these assist and hinder dismantling of eugenic logics.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Situating Autism
For decades, Autism Spectrum Disorders (henceforth referred to as “ASD” or “autism”)
have remained a part of the public consciousness, understood by way of contrasting frameworks
that define and explain the existence of the disorder. At various points in its history, autism has
been understood as both a biomedical disorder that impacts everyday communication and social
ability (see Bumiller, 2008; Jurecic, 2007), and a sociocultural identity stemming from nonnormative neurology (Heilker and Yergeau, 2011). Both attempt to explain how autism
functions, and how people on the spectrum live with their diagnoses, but in radically different
ways. Each frame carries with it a host of separate implications and suggestions for how we
communicate about autism, and how we communicate autism itself.
By and large, autism has been injected into the public consciousness in the context of a
neurological disorder that results in impaired communication, poor social skills, and delayed
development. As a result, the most common understanding of the term “autism” comes with the
added assumption that autism and Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) ought to be prevented, and
then cured (Bagatell, 2010). The disorder itself is thought of in the context of autism’s
impairments on interpersonal and group interaction (Jurecic, 2007). Beyond that, the “disorder”
is categorized by “functionality,” which attempts to quantify the ability of those impacted to
manage in social situations. Those labeled as “high functioning” are often characterized as being
able to “pass” as if they were not affected, while those labeled “low-functioning” tend to be
characterized by severe motor impairments and an inability to speak consistently (Jurecic, 2007).
Primarily, though, the biomedical frame establishes autism as a public health crisis that ought to
be studied and eradicated (Bagatell, 2010; Bumiller, 2008).
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My primary criticism of this biomedical frame remains that it ignores the role society
plays in generating “disordered” communication. Had neurotypical communication methods not
been established as “normal,” there would be less reason to believe autistic folks are inherently
impaired. Because the biomedical framework focuses almost solely on the deficiencies of those
diagnosed with ASD, understanding those deficiencies only happens when attempting to
universalize autistic experience and life to medicalize autistic folks. By and large, the biomedical
frame treats autism as a burden. However, it completely ignores those who identify with their
diagnosis not as a disorder, but as a significant part of who they are.
This gap is addressed by a shift in framework. Moving away from a biomedical
perspective of disability and autism allows for a more robust understanding of autistic existence.
Looking at autism as an identity marker assists in making visible the wants and desires of those
on the spectrum, rather than prescribing what is and is not disordered communication. While this
particular framework has a much less lengthy history, sampling the work of those looking to
understand “the autistic experience” serves as a way to better understand how autistic people
function, rather than simply looking at how ASD functions. In fact, autism is described by some
researchers as not just an identity, but as a rhetoric itself. Heilker and Yergeau (2011) explain:
Though the definitions of autism are also legion, what they, too, have in common
is a focus on language use in the social realm, a focus on communication in social
interaction. Indeed, two of the three primary descriptors of autistic behavior, two
of the three traditionally cited, fundamental ways that autism presents itself in the
world, per the medical establishment, have to do with communication in the
social. (p. 487)
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This reconceptualization of autism is, to an extent, a natural follow-up to much of the work that
operates from the identity frame. The point of research shifts from attempting to diagnose autism
to theorizing experience, a job best done from an identity framework. Applied to autism, the
framework established by Heilker and Yergeau proposes that autism is constructed by a socially
negotiated deviance from assumed communicative norms. However, they argue this deviance
itself constitutes its own norms, patterns, and language, thus constructing autism as a rhetoric in
and of itself. Said rhetoric then forms and shapes an identity unto itself.
Not all work is quite that concerned with the rhetoric of autism, however. Bagatell (2010)
detailed the autistic experience from the perspective of an outsider’s attempts to shift discourse
towards the understanding that autistic folks have of themselves. To do so, she employs
ethnographic methods, observing autistic folks interacting in a social club exclusively for autistic
folks and asking members about what they would like to see change in their interactions with
neurotypical people, how they see themselves, and what they think of autism as a whole.
Contextualizing the questions Bagatell asked is the “Self-Advocacy Movement,” described as
“the parallel cry for self-determination by another group of disabled people rebelling against
being long underestimated, deprived of choices, treated as eternal children, and thought to lead
lesser lives” (p. 36). Members of the group that Bagatell interviewed consistently expressed
disdain for the public perception of autistic people. Beyond that, interviewees often emphasized
the need for community. For instance, Ben told researchers:
It's like coming home … I've finally found a place where people don't care what
you do. As far as nobody thinking you're weird or anything like that. . . . It's just
'be yourself . . . It's like finding a world where you fit, where I'm not like an alien
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or something ... I can get off the cure mentality. It's okay to be me. (Bagatell
2010, p. 38)
Conceptualizing autism not as a biomedical affliction, but as an identity joined together through
shared experience and neurology allows for a more robust understanding of disability not as a
dehumanizing factor, but the result of a larger world built for abled people.
Positionality and Assemblage
“Positionality” attempts to define the social and political location of a given subject in
relation to the world around them. In conceptualizing the term and its usefulness in describing
the socio-political situation of a given subject, this thesis attempts to establish three frameworks
in which the term is used, all with different definitions and usage: the discursive frame, the local
frame, and the utilitarian frame. Each frame takes the same term and applies it in order to justify
a form of study attempting to take into account the social positioning of varied individuals.
While there is overlap in each frame, much of the difference lies in the assumptions that go into
what makes the term useful.
Discursive Framing
Discourse serves as one of the primary methods in which people make sense of the
stimuli surrounding them. As a process involving multiple parties, generating discourse requires
messages and stimuli to interact, clash, and mesh to create intelligible information to be “read.”
Ardis (1992) explains the role that outside audiences play in reading the language that we use,
and its interplay with our lived experience and bodies. In doing so, she grapples with the
construction of positionality, as audiences determine the preferred role of a given speaker while
reading their language. In this sense, the body also becomes a text that is evaluated along with
the words used within a given message. In the process, a tension is created: the speaker, an
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instructor in Ardis’ work, enters a given discourse with a social location that is juxtaposed with
the perceived social location of that speaker by the audience. Ardis (1992) explains:
In this essay my focus is on how we embody the language we speak: how an
audience (e.g., a student) "reads" the body of a speaker (e.g., a teacher) as it both
constructs the positionality of that speaking subject and construes that subject's
discursive authority.' In other words, rather than addressing the speech acts of the
feminist teacher, I will concentrate on the language, the rhetoric, of her body in
the classroom. (p. 168)
Ardis argues that the positionality of an instructor is not simply built by the self-image of the
instructor, but in tandem with outside perception of their assumed role. A discourse between the
audience and speaker is initiated, and ultimately provides a suggested social location that serves
as the expectation for the speaker. Rather than being internally generated based on identity
markers, usefulness, political positioning, or even physical location, one’s positionality is
constantly contested by never-ending discourse regarding the preferred communication and
power relationships that the speaker ought to embody, rather than the ones they do.
Other work operates from a similar frame, establishing positionality through the constant
discourse of performance. Hafen (2009) argues that positionality consists of “Identity
negotiation, location, and performance,” which ends with a series of political placements and
social locations that are then internalized and performed. The discursive element, then, comes in
with Hafen’s assertion that positionalities are not simply performed on the individual level, but
alongside, against, and for others. Hafen attempts to describe the contested positionality of
students post-9/11. Discourse on what constitutes “patriotism” colors the ascribed positionality
of actors like Michael Moore. The core beliefs of the students regarding the ideal role of
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Americans is in constant tension with the actual words and embodiment of actors like Moore.
His criticism of the United States, once labeled as “unpatriotic,” conflicts harshly with the
established drama (along with positional communities that don’t tangibly exist) that creates the
assumed positionality of the “American.” Hafen explains:
Those imagined communities are part of the myths of nationhood, required by all
nations in order to legitimate their borders and sanctify their histories… Having
proud sagas tainted with shameful acts is viewed by some as a more honest,
multivocal history and by others as an apologist, ignoble history. These differing
views exemplify the kinds of discursive frames that position actors apart in any
dialogue involving cultural dramas. (p. 64)
To return to Ardis’ work, the instructor performs their positionality not by themselves, but
alongside, in opposition to, and for the students who serve as the audience. They either
successfully embody power as anticipated by the students, or resist the ascribed location of the
role of “teacher,” complicating the positioning of the teacher. Rather than coming back with a
specific positionality, then, the frame established by Hafen and Ardis contends that one’s
positionality is constantly in motion, contested by new discourse.
Local Framing
What work like Ardis and Hafen’s does not center, though, is the specific embodied
location of the subject, and how it plays into their positional identification. Others, rather than
simply focusing on the discourse that creates positionality, generate a local frame much more
interested in the immediate physical component to positionality. Alexander and Warren (2002)
argue that positionality primarily concerns itself with “the political space we claim,” arguing that
racialized bodies inhabit a form of positionality unique to their physical and geographic location.
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Social location is theorized as the result of interplay between identity and space. Kinefuchi and
Orbe (2008) note that there is a difference between social locations and racial standpoints,
though both are rooted in the physical location of the subject. In their study, positionality is read
as the proximity with which subjects view, interact with, and respond to a communicative
stimulus. Like in Alexander and Warren’s work, positionality is more closely related to the
spatial metaphor of “location.” One’s immediate environment, physical body, and geographical
location interact in order to generate a position that is physically and communicatively inhabited
by the subject.
Alexander and Warren (2002) use narrative description as a means of interrogating the
positionality of both Black and White scholars within a dialogue with one another. By situating
their positions through their physical bodies, along with real-world interactions that happened in
a specific point in space, Alexander and Warren are able to discuss the impact of diversity
policies, pedagogy, and academia on themselves. Ultimately, their positions as being able to
resist erasure or recognize the power struggle that happens between White and Black scholars
stems partially from their Black and White bodies. Kinefuchi and Orbe (2008), on the other
hand, utilize the local frame as a means of explaining the positional context surrounding
subjects’ response to the racial messages in the movie Crash. Students’ resistance, acceptance, or
ambivalence to anti-racist messaging can then be explained by a metaphor for physical location:
those who inhabited a position “closer” to the source material and saw themselves as participants
often shared physical commonalities with the Black subjects of the movie, constructing a social
position (and standpoint) that is closer to Crash. Those who did not share physical
commonalities were socially distanced from the messages, and their physical bodies correlated to
a positionality distanced from the movie’s core argument. The interplay of the subjects’ physical
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body (usually referring to race) intersects with their ability to physically locate themselves in
similar situations in order to generate a position from which the message is received.
Utilitarian Framing
Puar (2012) generates a framework for intersectionality that suggests that identities are a
collection of events, rather than a simple point on a grid. Puar asserts that identity is better served
when thought of as an assemblage, and could be defined by what identity does, rather than what
identity is. While positionality, intersectionality, and identity are not precisely synonymous, a
similar utilitarian framework is useful for discussion on positionality as well. Cooks (2003) uses
positionality as a tool to emphasize the contexts of symbols expressed through lived bodies,
focusing far more on the utility of a given position rather than a concrete definition of
“positionality” as a term. For instance, Cooks defines the position of “Whiteness” as a set of
rhetorical strategies employed to build, defend, and maintain hegemonic identities. By this
framework, positionality is constantly in motion, redefined and reconstituted by the strategies by
which we determine what a given position is or does.
Such a utilitarian approach to identity offers a way to discuss how communication from
or within a given position translates into real-world action, how it impacts agency, and how it
changes the strategies used to perform a given identity. Cooks (2003) describes the strategies of
Whiteness as a means of interrogating the pedagogy of interracial communication courses.
However, Cooks situates her study, much like Hafen (2009), in the aftermath of 9/11, exploring a
reconstituted White position. For instance, the essay is grounded within a student’s response to
being asked what it means to “be a good citizen” after 9/11:
“No one is telling you what they really feel,” she said, looking around at the class
in exasperation. “If I was that woman, and I saw something suspicious, you better
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bet I would be on the phone to the police. You don’t think if I could have
prevented what happened on September 11th, I would have? That’s what it means
to be a good citizen.” (p. 245)
Whiteness is then contextualized by how it is that the quoted student could have come to the
conclusion that she did. By discussing the positionality of Whiteness by what Whiteness does,
Cooks attempts to explore the methods by which Whiteness can be taught or talked about within
the classroom. It also allows for a more practical definition of “Whiteness” as both a positional
and pedagogical term. A framework built explicitly on what a position does ends up being far
more capable of describing what that position will end up doing.
It is worth noting that there is overlap between the discursive and utilitarian frameworks
described here. After all, discourse is always doing “something,” even when one is not actively
aware that anything is being done. The primary difference comes in how one reaches something
being done, however. In Cooks (2003), Whiteness’ position is constructed not from interaction
with marginalized identities, but for the express purpose of marginalizing those identities. The
action and discourse that comes from Whiteness, the interplay between oppressor and oppressed,
becomes the sole purpose of a given position’s existence. The utilitarian frame posits that the
sole purpose for a position’s existence is the action and discourse it creates, but the positionality
indeed comes first as a means of achieving “what it does.” The discursive frame also
acknowledges that “something is done,” as discourse is a thing that is “done,” but positions
within the framework exist outside the scope of what the purpose of given discourse is.
Critical Disability Studies
Engaging disability as part of a larger project aimed at liberation of marginalized peoples
necessitates a broader purview of what disability is, has been, and can be. Such a need is filled
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by the existence of critical disability studies, or CDS, described by Goodley (2017) as “a
transdisciplinary space breaking boundaries between disciplines, deconstructing professional /
lay distinctions and decolonizing traditional medicalized views of disability with socio-cultural
conceptions of disablism” (p. 81). McRuer (2017) further explains: there is no “purity” or
“innocence” in discourses of disability (p. 64). CDS necessarily explores the roles that disablist
conventions play in the creation of oppressions that impact disabled folks in both a theoretical
and material sense. That also means interrogating disability, disorder, and the body itself.
McRuer goes on to argue that in order to truly understand crip existences (as a simultaneous
extension, off-shoot, and tie-in to disability), one must confront what crippling means, is, and
does. However, there is no “innocent” or benign way of doing so, fundamentally framing CDS as
a hostile presence in opposition to existing social orders. Existing while crippled inherently
upsets the order of imagined non-disabled futures, frustrating the eugenic logic that frames any
and all consideration of a future without disability. In other words, CDS becomes a lens of
opposition in order to confront the future for disabled folks, self-described “crips” and cripples,
autistics, and anyone else who finds themselves on the business end of disablism.
Activists, academics, and disabled folks have long theorized the possibility of a world
that is both non-hostile to disability and does not need to make room for us, as it already has
been made available. The genre of crip futurism exists to explore the possibilities of a world built
by disabled folks, for disabled folks. Griffith (2017) explains of existing crip futures: “So much
of the imaginary future is ‘perfect’ because crips don’t exist. The message is physical perfection
= utopia. All physical ills have been techno/magically cured” (para. 5). Crip discourse builds a
future in which disability is properly recognized as not a fault of the body, but instead a result of
an environment built for the abled. In generating such discourse, we offer ourselves access to a
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more just future, in which performance of crip embodiment becomes more than a cycle of
disclosure in which disability becomes identity.
If disability serves as identity, though, the rhetorics of its existence contextualize the
embodiment of that identity. The body, and by extension the identities that are contextualized by
that body, generate meaning through social interaction (Garland-Thomson, 2000). The act of
living as an Other is the act of constant self-representation, to be made constantly aware of your
Otherness and wear it as “your” body. Scholars use performance art and rhetoric to better
understand the modes through which disabled folks make meaning of their identities and bodies,
and ultimately come to better understand what it means to perform being a crip. To return to
Garland-Thomson (2000) for a moment, the role of the body as a part of the performance of
living is treated as paramount:
The disabled body is not only the medium but the content of performance. The
disabled body on view is the performance. […] In addition to always addressing
the question of "What happened to you?" that textual autobiography answers,
disability performance at the same time reenacts the primal scene of disability in
which the normative viewer encounters the disabled body and demands an
explanation. (p. 334)
In short, performance of disability becomes a constant justification of the disabled body’s
existence.
This even applies to abled bodies attempting to perform disability. As Kuppers (2007)
notes, “when nondisabled people don disability paraphernalia or masquerade as disabled, the
results rarely offer interesting insights to disability scholars looking for resistances to dominant
images of disability” (p. 81). Instead, performers simply replicate dominant justifications for
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disabled existence. Bodies become disabled as a result of becoming marginalized, and therefore
deserve their marginalization. The modes of enacting one’s disability, in performance, become
filtered through dominant narratives regarding use, aesthetic, and desirability. Wheelchairs
become portrayed as clunky and unwieldy. Crutches become frustrating and unreliable. Hearing
aids become bulky and uncomfortable. The performers simply use the markers of disability to
signify the marginalization of disability proper.
Such a tendency is explained by Garland-Thomson (2017) as “eugenic logic,” or the
logics by which futures insist upon eliminating disabled presence. Garland-Thomson explains
further that eugenic logic is: “modernity’s sustained commitment to eliminating disability from
the human condition, this literalizing of disability as disqualification…the master trope of the
shared world” (p. 53). Through this logic, it becomes apparent that futures that fail to take access
and disability into consideration do so because they simply assume that through eugenic
processes, disability will be eliminated. Of course, by extension, if disability no longer exists,
neither do disabled people.
Resistance to these logics form the backbone of crip identity. Eisenhaur (2007) furthers
that positive identification with disability challenges narratives centered on tragedy, and
therefore the eugenic logic. Positive identification does not make speculated futures any less
eugenicist, but it does allow an avenue to resist dehumanizing portrayals of disability. GarlandThomson (2017) argues that narrative plays a significant role in establishing positive crip
identity, by reinforcing the restorative potential of self-understanding. Narrative and performance
promote self-identification, constructing disability through existence rather than by aligning
oneself with prescribed depictions of what crippled existence must look like or be.
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Ultimately, the underlying motive of studying crip identity is to supplant the eugenicist
notion that disability stems from the body, instead asserting that disability stems from
environment. Almassi (2010) explains further:
If life is easier for righties than for lefties, it is because our modern built
environment has been constructed to work for the dominant group’s modes of
functioning. Consider also lactose intolerance, often regarded as functionally
abnormal in the West. Yet considering that many people worldwide are lactose
intolerant, and considering the historical peculiarity of substantial diary
consumption, being lactose intolerant impedes successful functioning only as
framed within particular cultural contexts… Making the case that left handedness
and lactose intolerance come to be disadvantageous only in specific social and
cultural contexts may seem to be easier than doing so for commonly supposed
disabilities such as paraplegia. Yet what the preceding discussion shows is that
finding difference attendant to a particular mode of functioning is not sufficient to
identify this difference as a disadvantage in an impaired body to be fixed; in
understanding the causes of disability, then, we need a more robust account of
disability. (p. 131)
Through understanding crip identities as societal in origin, reinforced by environment, the
project of creating crip futures is no longer a eugenic project of eliminating disability. Instead,
creating crip futures becomes a project of changing environments so that disabled folks can
move, communicate, and live along with their disabilities, rather than in spite of them. To return
to McRuer (2017), drawing upon more anti-social theories of crip existence paints a far more
bleak regard of the very idea of crip futures. Rather than accept an easy reinforcement of the
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social model of disability, arguing that it is society itself that renders bodies “disabled,” one must
endeavor to consider whether or not a “future” as a theoretical goal is even worthwhile on an
individual basis.
Through self-reflexive narrative, I plan to use this thesis to interrogate the interplay
between the academy and autism while also employing narrative as a means of building a better
understanding of an autistic futurity. To assist in the process, two research questions will be
pursued in the paper:
RQ1: In what ways does academia replicate and propagate eugenic logics?
RQ2: How do responses to those logics generate a future for an autistic academic?
Now that I’ve laid a theoretical grounding for this project, the next chapter will review the
methodological practices utilized in this thesis.
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Chapter Three: Methods
Stories, according to Burke (1973), serve as a contextualizing force that provides both
context and clarity for the world and lives in which we exist. They help us understand, negotiate,
and find fidelity in the situations that make up those stories. Adams (2008) is clear: we learn our
ways of being through telling stories, establishing and connecting narratives about ourselves and
others. Stories construct our positions and interrogate the positions of others in relation to
ourselves. In the end, narratives (and, by extension, the stories that comprise them) make sense
of our relationships to others and ourselves.
For some scholars, narrative is its own part of our existence, something that is shared
with others through intent. Coles (1989) operates from a metaphor framing narrative as a “tool,”
while Richardson (1990) argues that stories are made “available” to people like a resource to be
utilized in order to make sense of the world. Narratives, here, are tangible. They are a thing that
can be possessed, shared, carried, rejected, and adapted. Brody (2002) argues further: narrative is
something that is “tried on” like clothing. In all of these frameworks, narrative is simply one
component of a larger existence, something that can be called upon when necessary to make
sense of chaos.
Alternatively, narrative can be ontological. Fisher (1984) argues that narrative is an
inescapable part of our lives, impossible to ignore. This framework positions narrative as more
than a mere tool, but something closer to life itself. Brody (2002) continues, arguing that
narrative actually constructs the way we experience life, reality, and everything therein. In this
sense, stories are not merely a means of explaining existence; existence is perceived, and perhaps
understood primarily, in narrative form itself. When we share stories, we help construct what
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reality is in the eyes of others. When we explore the stories of others, our own realities are
shaped and changed as a result. To be is to be a part of a narrative.
In constructing a narrative of disability, disabled folks, crips, and autistics need to be able
to navigate a world not designed for them. As mentioned before, this includes autistics like
myself. I find myself often in the unenviable position of needing to defend myself from disablist
oppression, while also needing to manage the fact that autism is a largely invisible disability.
This thesis situates crip performance and existence through autoethnographic reflection on
various parts of my time in graduate school, to interrogate my positionality as an autistic
graduate student outside of the context of establishing a “grid” pinpointing my existence,
generating discourse regarding the assemblage of experience and performance that makes up
who “A Adams” is and what they “do” outside of grid-based intersectional analysis.
Puar (2012) argues that we ought to be reconceptualizing intersectionality and identity
with a single notion: grids happen, and we ought to be looking into how to make them not
happen. “Grids,” here, refer to the simplistic method of identifying individuals by identity
markers, looking for intersections on a grid that then comprises the individual and their
existence. The “Black Woman,” per the grid metaphor, happens at the intersection between
“Blackness” and “Womanhood.” That intersection is then represented (and acted upon) by a grid
of identities, where two lines meet. Therefore, one is able to pinpoint the social location of
people and their identities by simply pointing to the “correct” crossing of lines, mapping out the
entirety of the individual identity in a single moment. Of course, Puar does not leave her critique
there, and suggests a larger reconceptualization that requires a redefinition of the subject and
their identity. However, she does pose an important question in her initial criticism: How do we
define the social location of individuals and groups of people? A simple discussion of
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“intersectionality” does not adequately define the standpoint or narrative of the individual and
their many identities, because that is not what the term is supposed to do in the first place.
Instead, the assemblage of experience and position addressed by narrative attempts to define the
social and political location of a given subject in relation to the world around them. Essentially,
narrative allows us to center not just what people are, but what they do with the stories that
comprise them.
Autoethnography serves as a means of providing context to narrative. Boylorn (2008)
writes that autoethnographers “look in (at themselves) and out (at the world) connecting the
personal to the cultural” (p. 413). In doing so, autoethnographers provide a key space in which
phenomenon can be explored through a deeply intimate lens. The phenomenological experiences
that come with identity can be examined through experience, allowing for deeper interrogation of
cultural distortions and misrepresentations. When conducting study from the margins,
autoethnography approaches and generates discourse regarding marginalization, serving not just
as critique of power, but resistance to structures that generate marginalization. By making the
researcher the subject, autoethnography allows for academic inquiry that refuses to speak for
others, making it powerful in situating the gaze on the self. At its core, autoethnography tells a
story about power, and the role that the subject plays in resisting it, reinforcing it, and surviving
it.
However, autoethnography does not need to be prescriptive in order to be useful, or even
need to pretend to be generalizable. To adapt Boylorn (2008): as an autoethnographer, I do not
intend to speak on behalf of all autistic folks or to insinuate that my reaction is the only/best/right
response; it is simply my response. Boylorn continues: “Like all autoethnography what follows is
messy, sometimes contradictory, sometimes complicated. By telling my story and reflecting on
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my own lived experience (reality), I am using autoethnography to talk to myself” (p. 415). In
order to approach an understanding of a lived, embodied futurity that speaks to me, as a subject, I
need to reflect not just on events, but on my response to events. I must make myself aware of the
moments in which I am Othered, and moments in which I Other myself. Ultimately, I must
implicate not just my surroundings, but myself in the generation of utopian futures for disabled
folks, as that future applies to me.
Autoethnography, at its core, is the attempt to live with stories from the position closest
to that view: the self (Adams 2008). Narrative contains reference and elements of “the good
life,” which become filtered through the pen, keyboard, or mouth of the storyteller, distilled for a
given purpose. For this paper, that purpose is to explore my role as an autistic person in
academia. As such, the stories contained in this thesis are a testament to “oppressive systems
that, because of their oppressiveness, give us a story to tell” (Adams, 2008, p. 181). As with any
endeavor that seeks to labor against the machinations of power, this project is embroiled in
ethical concerns on two fronts: concerns over my own agency to represent my experiences
through personal narrative, and concerns over the representations of those who are implicated in
my renditions of disabling rhetoric in the academy.
Reconciling these ethical tensions is no easy feat. Edwards (2021) argues that
autoethnographers “need to find a range of acceptable ways to ensure that persons referred to in
autoethnography should be advised, and where possible their recall as to what happened should
be sought for clarification” (p. 5). Such concerns are a frequent struggle in autoethnography,
considering the method features a microscopic analysis of the self which, as Tolich (2010) notes,
is “porous, leaking to the other without due ethical consideration” (p. 1608). Tolich and others
might suggest securing informed consent from those involved in the stories we tell in
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autoethnography, but Adams (2008) questions, “When should I seek permission to write about
others in my life writings? Will I silence myself worrying about harming them? And how might
the ethical practice of informed consent function as psychic/ethical violence on my sharing of
stories” (p. 184). If there is anything to be learned from these tensions, it is that navigating the
ethical terrain of autoethnography is like traversing a minefield.
No solution to the problem of ethical representation in autoethnography will appease
everyone. However, in the interests of upholding a commitment to both myself and those who
appear in my renditions of disabling rhetoric in academia, I have taken certain precautions in this
thesis. First, I have de-identified the narratives as much as possible to preserve the fidelity of the
stories while protecting (or obscuring) the identities of those involved. Second, where such deidentification was difficult or impossible, I have chosen to remove certain narratives that would
have otherwise featured prominently in an analysis such as this. The stories you see here
represent my best attempts at speaking truth to power while shielding those in positions of power
from scrutiny they may find uncomfortable--regardless of how their disabling rhetoric made me
feel in the moment.
To this end, the remainder of this thesis presents vignettes from various points of my
three years in graduate school and represents them as moments of reflection—and critical
intervention—on what being a “disabled” graduate student means in a material sense, reflecting
on the political, sensual, and emotional impact of various conversations, experiences, and
traumas that form assemblage of a post-graduate “career.” These stories are messy, incomplete,
and at times difficult to write. They all are me talking to and with myself, piecing together a
three-year period in my life in which disability was most crystalized. They involve an
exploration into a future I had not understood. They involve mentors, friends, and academic
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family grappling with logics in contexts in which I said nothing. I explore not just what I do, but
what I am. In doing so, I will explore narrative and being from both a practical standpoint and an
ontological one. The stories of navigating academia as a disabled student, as an autistic student,
and as a crippled student offer real tools to understand “disability” as a confounding factor in
navigating a graduate program. In addition, it would be impossible to coherently reflect on my
time in academia without recognizing the role that Blackness plays in contextualizing both those
experiences and who I am. On an ontological level, the vignettes that follow organize what
disability means, and ultimately comprise the assemblage that makes A Adams a person who
exists. By looking inward at myself to tease out a depiction of autistic positionality, and looking
out at the eugenic world I live in to define the present, these vignettes allow for a full, embodied,
experienced understanding of what the future is, and what it could be.
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Chapter Four: The Othering of A Adams
Approaching a definition for a disabled academic future requires an in-depth exploration
of what constitutes the present. Bracketed by eugenic beliefs and logics, my time in graduate
school has been a series of moments in which I am Othered, one after another. These moments
serve as the backbone of my (mis)education, and define my relationships with my identity, my
instructors, and my work. From conferences, to classrooms, to university hallways, the times in
which I find myself most removed from the rest of my colleagues are the moments in which my
identity is most crystalized. Each vignette that follows is one part of how a larger future is
defined, by presenting an unfiltered image of what the present looks like. Without understanding
what the Othering of A Adams looks like, there can be no meaningful interrogation of what the
future of A Adams could look like.
“If you need anything”: Othering the super-crip
It’s syllabus day and I, frankly, expected better than this. That is what I think as I listen to
yet another professor launch into yet another lengthy diatribe about how they’re not actually
disablist, but actually definitely supportive and how if I need anything I can just let them know
and how they’re here for me, or whatever this faculty member is telling themselves this week,
shortly before skipping the disability accommodations section of their syllabus when going over
course policies. I may as well be able to see the future, at this point. I hear the same platitudes
once, and suddenly I just know I’m getting nothing from them. It’s a cynical place, but as I sit in
class after another round of pointless introductions, I at least know what to expect.
This is what the introductions always look like. Someone calls on me, and asks what I
like to research. I mention autism. I am asked why specifically autism. I mention that the current
research is pretty horrible on average and the entire discipline needs to take a hard look in the
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mirror before relying on “foundational” literature that is problematic at best, and eugenic at
worst. Of course, I use more pleasant language. Often some nonsense about how I am
“fascinated” with disability and I want to contribute to the literature base. I play the dutiful role
of the starstruck student, pretending that academia is some unique existence removed from
disablist violence. And then everyone buys it, and then someone says those words:
Well, if you need anything, I’m here.
That phrase always means the same thing. While the instructor means well, I will have to
be the one who explains what I need from an accessibility standpoint. I will need to constantly
and continuously self-disclose in order to simply survive in academia. But what it truly means is
that I need to produce. I need to create. I need to be a productive academic. Write a paper. Finish
a literature review. Work on my thesis. Perform my GTA duties. Coach the entire TA office on
how autism works. Present research. Revise my CV. And on top of all of that, I need to make
sure I am accommodated so that I do not fall behind.
I ignore that thought and try to refocus on the class at hand. Another student is
introducing themselves, though for the life of me I cannot bring myself to figure out what they
are saying. It’s like what they’re saying is going in one ear, rattling around my head, and then
just vanishing. It’s frustrating, but I try not to show. It’s just introductions, and I would definitely
be labeled “That Student” if I asked for someone to repeat an introduction. Sorry, person behind
me in class. I will never know your name, your interests, or how long you have been here.
Upsetting as it is, I am struggling to focus. Call it brain fog, executive dysfunction, or just plain
inattentiveness. I don’t know a precise term for it, and I don’t want to. I just know I feel bad.
Simultaneously over and under-stimulated. I have done this before, though, so I manage as well
as I can. I wipe my sweaty hands on my pants, and try to refocus. It almost works. I can at least
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register what words are being said by other students. Not that I can tell you what any of them
mean, but at least I am ostensibly listening.
The lecture crawls by, a dull drone in the background. This feels slow. This class feels
too slow. I chew lightly on my fingers, trying to bring myself back to the class, but nothing
happens. The professor sounds like she is underwater, and I can’t make out a single word anyone
says. A few students ask questions, but they’re no more intelligible than the professor. But I have
practiced what I do in these situations. I take a few deep breaths, and keep my hands busy. Every
so often, I nod as if I understand what is being said. Just don’t draw attention to it. As usual, this
approach works.
Minutes pass, and I am back. I’ve missed some amount of information, but it isn’t enough
to actually set me back all that far. The course will split into groups, which will be the people we
work with all semester. Even having missed much of what was said, I am acutely aware that the
idea is to get a grad student to guide the undergrads every step of the semester. I am also acutely
aware that this will not happen. First of all, I don’t want to. I’m not interested in babysitting.
Second of all, I don’t know any of these students. They don’t know I am on the spectrum, while
the professor certainly does. I make eye contact with the professor, praying that they at least
begin to get how awkward this is for me. The instructor holds eye contact for a second, and I
think they nod.
But nope. They simply go on with the rest of the class. I pick up what the general
instructions are from context clues, and engage in discussion with a bunch of students who
frankly I do not want to talk to. I’m not quite sure how I will manage this semester, but overall, I
know the class should be simple enough to pass. Besides, there are only like five assignments.
What’s the worst that can happen? The professor walks over and asks to talk. It’s a bit of a

27
shock, and I am sure that is plastered all over my face. Quickly, I straighten up and nod,
following the professor outside while the undergrads and other graduate students talk about the
plan for the course this semester.
Again, I am struck with a strong sense of deja vu, as the professor begins some spiel
about how important accessibility is to her, and how the department has done an excellent job of
creating the most accessible graduate courses they can. I stay quiet. I’ve learned that when
academics start preening about the alleged accessibility of their classwork, it is best to shut up
and let them be happy. Besides, it’s early in the class, and I don’t know what the course will look
like. I could, after all, be in for a pleasant shock. The professor continues, letting me know that I
can ask her for anything I need for access purposes. I remain guarded. I’ve played this game
enough times by now to know better. This class being the same as the others would crush me if I
did not stay guarded..
I’ve gone ahead and tried to make sure that all of our class activities have been edited to
account for disability.
I’ve never heard this one before. For just a moment, there’s some hope for this class yet.
And my reaction is obviously physical, as the professor perks up instantly. I do what I can to
make it clear that I am interested. Finally, this class might be better. Academia might be better. I
might enjoy this, and be a disabled student, and not the disabled student. I’m not entirely sure
where my expectations became so low that a statement that a course would try its best to not be
an absolute drag was such a pick-me-up, but here we are.
The short conversation ends with no response, and I make my way back into the
classroom. It dawns on me as students follow with their eyes as I sit back down that, for better or
for worse, the jig is up. After all, the professor just made eye contact with me, made a statement
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about the course being accommodating for disability, and then asked me to talk during a break
from class. Of course, they all know who the disabled kid is. I don’t let my eyes linger on any
individual student for long enough to know whether or not they are watching me, but I can feel
their stares. And whether they are real or imagined, the experience remains the same. I try to take
deeper breaths; the room suddenly feels much smaller. My collar is hot, the bridge of my nose
feels ready to burst, and breathing is suddenly an ordeal. My brow starts to burn, a sharp sting
racing up and down the two stitched breaks in my right eyebrow. I never learned why this
happens, but I know what it means. I no longer wish to be here. And frankly, I no longer wish to
be anywhere. As I arrive at my seat and avoid eye contact with the group I will be tasked with
working alongside for the rest of the semester, I arrive at a frustrating conclusion:
This actually blows.
For the rest of the class, I go out of my way to answer any and all questions posed. I cite
performance studies literature as well as I know the genre, despite not having taken any formal
education in the field until now. I ask strong questions to invite deeper discussion, involving the
entire class when I can. I do what I can to steer conversation in a way that allows for the most
critical conversation possible. I ignore my body, steamrolling through every physical sign that I
have reached my limits. As my brow burns, I reach up to scratch my brow scars, which simply
makes the sting worse. My hands feel dry, as does my mouth. My jaw hurts from talking too
much. The lights feel far too bright. Blinking is a labor, but yet I press on. My collar remains hot,
but I simply fan myself discreetly every few minutes. And eventually, gracefully, mercifully, the
class ends. Students are dismissed, and I cheerfully catch up the undergrads in my group on the
expectations for next week. They understand, and comment on just how smart I seem. One of
them comments that they couldn’t even tell that I am disabled. I laugh at the comment and shrug.
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“Nobody ever sees it when I meet them for the first time.”
After waving the students goodbye, and maintaining a hearty, spirited conversation with
the professor all the way back to the empty graduate assistant office, I collapse into a chair. I
launch into a panic attack, heaving strained breaths and trying to calm my brow and chest. My
arms are lead. My legs are jelly. I have pushed my body far beyond what it could do, but the
aftereffects happen in the dark. Nobody sees, and I am confronted with an ugly truth: I need to
do this three times a week for another year and a half. Maybe graduate school was a mistake.
Initial impressions on colleagues and instructors play a critical role in how I manage
balancing disability with perceived competence. By exerting complete control over how and
when I disclose my disability, I retain agency in the rate at which I expose myself to the beliefs
and internalized truths of undergraduate students, fellow graduate assistants, and the professors
who ultimately decide whether I retain my funding to continue my education. Regardless of the
actual beliefs of the surrounding academics, the need to maintain control over how others read
my behaviors is paramount to my comfort. At the crux of that discomfort is the unfortunate space
between being dismissed as defective and labeled a “super-crip.” McGillivray, O’Donnell,
McPherson, and Misener (2019) explain that an overreliance on “overcoming adversity” as a
primary narrative for understanding disabled subjectivity creates a particularly dangerous
disabled identity: the “super-crip.” As disabled folks move from invisibility, constant pressure to
overcome adversity becomes its own pressure, remarginalizing disabled folks who fail to meet
expectations set far beyond any reasonable mark. On the other hand, those who manage to live
up to the expectations of eugenic cultures contribute to their own erasure, as overcoming
obstacles created to hinder disability serves as sufficient argument to heap more responsibility
onto the super-crip, without meaningfully improving access.
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The medical model of ability and disability provide the backbone of the supercrip
narrative. When all disability is boiled down to personal impairment and inability, narratives of
personal loss and tragedy become projected onto individuals. From there, disability is placed on
the margins of humanity until those narratives of tragedy are overturned. In return, those who
overcome are welcomed for their ability to approximate the idealized neoliberal body, in that the
super-crip bodymind can produce at a rate deemed acceptable. In doing so, the super-crip is
elevated to heroic status, defying the odds to realize their full humanity. McGillivray, O’Donnell,
McPherson, and Misener (2019) go on to argue that such a narrative serves to undermine
attempts by disabled folks to intervene in disablism, by diverting attention from real, experienced
barriers that disabled folks face. However, there is more to critique from the model. In addition
to inhibiting cultural recognition of disablist structures, embracing the super-crip imposes undue
burdens to re-engage with neoliberal demands to produce in order to seem “normal” at large. The
very positionality of the disabled bodymind becomes unstable, as it is simultaneously defined by
both its alleged deficiency and expected normalcy. The super-crip position is not one that is
granted equal status to the abled bodymind, but is still elevated above disability. By
spectacularizing the disabled bodymind, the eugenic logic makes its demands clear: to escape
disablism, one must assimilate.
As a graduate student, my own options are clear. Once outed, the supercrip narrative is
activated. Any success in graduate school is fated to be lionized as a stunning act of overcoming
educational barriers, be they tangible or perceived. Expectations rise. Accommodations were
offered, but they will continue to go unused. Performance in neoliberal contexts in which a
market confines the ways in which I can behave in the classroom makes requesting
accommodations nearly impossible, eliminating one of the few options available. The perceived
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dearth of autistic professors leads directly to simple calculus: in order to obtain a career, I need to
overachieve. And the fastest route to achievement is to become the super-crip. And so tell-tale
signs from my body go ignored, as it becomes infinitely more important to secure letters of
recommendation, allies in the department, and the goodwill of those who will eventually read
and approve my thesis.
Further, agency becomes a crucial turning point. In losing the ability to navigate my own
disclosure, control over disabled narratives is turned over to the class at large. Defining
disability, when I do not actively define it myself, becomes the job of observers. Griffiths (2020)
explains:
For all of us, capability is a capacity to learn and develop and is often assessed on
initial employment. Ability is contextual, temporal and often unclear. Willingness,
[...] is the neoliberal devolution of responsibility to the individual. Willingness is
both what can drive individuals to overcome barriers of capability and ability, but
unfortunately can also be used to criticise individuals when they cannot overcome
those same (often structural) barriers. (p.125)
Perception of my performance in class was never in my hands, but once my status as a disabled
student is disclosed, evaluation of my performance in relation to barriers erected in academia
happens exclusively externally. To this end, performing the supercrip makes the most sense. It is
the primary mode by which I can reclaim agency. The assigned identity of the subject under
neoliberalism is that of a worker. Navigating this identity simply means filtering disability
through labor. At the end of the day, super-crips get into PhD programs and get hired. Exhausted
autistic students end up burning out on the adjunct track.
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“Do We Have Any Questions?”: Othering Through Citation
Well, we seem popular.
This is my only sardonic thought as I look into the crowd of my first ever paper
presentation at a national conference. I am the last to speak on a panel of forensics researchers,
all from my institution. Each has brilliant things to say, excellent critiques to make, and the hard
data so often missing from forensics research to back it up. Each of them are trying to make the
activity better in some way or another. As am I, I guess. I stop to pull up my paper on my laptop,
making sure I have a coherent outline to explore all the work I did. I don’t want to need to
refresh myself while my friends are delivering what amount to pitches to make forensics a more
equitable activity, and I am certain they will do the same for me.
It would be nice if there were more than, like, six people here, though.
It is early morning on Saturday at the conference. Many are still recovering from seeing
colleagues, alums, and friends the night before. Others are simply sleeping in. Others still are out
for breakfast with friends and colleagues, likely chuckling about the poor schmucks who were
assigned early morning sessions that will almost assuredly be empty. I get it. I did the same thing
yesterday morning over a bagel. I had forgotten, then, that I would be one of those poor
schmucks the very next day. What a life. What a conference. At least the handful of people here
look engaged.
As we make our way down the line, a couple of attendees indicate that they have
questions, but hold onto them for the end of the session. A nod here, a scribble in a notepad
there, a scrunched-up face when something objectionable is heard, all the typical indicators that
something of note was said. There should be good questions at the end. Finally, it is my turn.
Setting my timer, it occurs to me that my paper is fundamentally different from the others’
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arguments. The others all argue that there are procedural issues with the way that ballots are
written in speech and debate, in various ways. Some focus on the frequency of problematic
ballots, while others take issue with the fact that they happen at all. I, on the other hand, take
issue with the ballot itself. Immediately, I know this is not going to go well. Some lady in the
front row blows a heavy breath out of her nose as soon as I mention disability. A couple of
people look intrigued, and the rest look straight-up disconnected.
Jeez, would it kill y’all to at least pretend to give a damn?
I explain where my analysis is coming from: as a performer, the ballot’s role was largely
to tell me and students like me to simply stop looking and acting so dang disabled. Stop
fidgeting. Make more eye contact. Your movements could be smoother. Stop acting like a robot
and just be yourself. Or whatever nonsense abled folks tell themselves is actually super
empowering! but is mostly just really annoying. Of course, it’s the academy, so it isn’t like I can
just say that those comments are stupid. Instead, I needed to concoct some theoretical lens so an
old white dude can say that it’s stupid for me. It dawns on me that this is a very cynical way of
approaching the situation, but those are the breaks.
As I finish, the screwed-up faces don’t really change, and I know that the Q&A session is
going to be a wild one. More importantly, I’m expecting one of the most annoying staples of
academic questioning, and it comes pretty early. After the others field a couple of questions that
are mostly just defenses of forensics, rather than real inquiry regarding the content of the papers,
one older attendee has her question taken. This one did not scrunch her face when I was
presenting, but honestly after her question, I wish she had.
“So, like, how are we defining disability?”
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Immediately, I know what she meant to ask. She doesn’t want my definition of autism.
She doesn’t want my definition of disability. She wants a neat little set of parentheses. She wants
page numbers. She wants a spiel. She wants me to start with “Well, the literature argues…” She
wants a citation. And I, frankly, don’t have one for her. Time feels still. It’s hot, and I’m no
longer comfortable. I feel the cold pinprick of sweat beading on the back of my neck, and I am
suddenly hyper aware of every part of my body. The feeling of not belonging is far from an
enjoyable one, but today it crosses from a low hum of unease to outright physical discomfort.
Which feels stupid, because I expected this. I knew this question would be here, because it
always is. The moment lingers, and then as quickly as it came, it passes. I toss together some
inane answer I’ve long since forgotten, integrating the works of authors I would go on to include
in literature reviews for course papers, conference presentations, and my thesis. In real time, the
answer was there immediately. Any pause felt was purely my imagination, or maybe my
frustration getting the better of me.
The next question asks about why I felt the paper is necessary. The next asks if there is
any literature arguing that policing physical performance is disablist. The next asks if the
literature supports a different kind of ballot. The next one becomes the next one becomes the
next one becomes the next question that asks about the literature about the literature about the
literature. Every answer must be contextualized by academic work. Anything else is too
anecdotal. Too informal. Not good enough. Not trustworthy. Maybe the student is lying about
feeling marginalized? Maybe the students just don’t know what marginalization looks like.
Maybe I don’t know what autism really is so I need Yergeau or Bagatell to tell everyone what I
can just tell them myself, and then to define disability I need to consult Ferris or maybe GarlandThomson this time if I want to feel spicy. Or maybe I need to invoke all the foundational

35
research. You know, the papers with titles like “Is there a ‘language of the eyes’? Evidence from
normal adults, and adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome” because clearly, this is the kind of
research that I need to define myself.
Finally, the session ends. Everyone is out of questions. The panelists congratulate each
other on writing good papers. The audience, which seems to have slightly grown over the course
of the session, trickles out the door. I feel my shoulders drop like lead. Every breath feels like it
takes an eternity, and I can barely move my legs to leave. I have finished defending my
existence, my experience, and pitched possibly making the world (or just forensics) a slightly
better place for folks like me. I also got finished justifying everything I know about myself with
citation after citation. I am sure it isn’t intentional. I am not sure it is even that big of a deal. But
at my first national conference, it becomes apparent: I matter insomuch as there is literature to
prove I matter, and even then all it does is define the ways in which I matter. Then and there, I
resolve to write autoethnography. A little inkling of rebellion, aimed at a frustrating hour in a
frustrating weekend. I will not be reduced to a citation. I will absolutely not be reduced to a
handful of papers, scattered across a panel. This seething anger feels raw, new, fresh. And
somehow, the episode is entirely drab. Commonplace. I may as well still be in Mankato. My life
in academia, to this point, is four-syllable words, obscure citations, and posturing. Credit must be
granted for every breath, every thought, every feeling, every noseburn, every missed moment of
eye contact, every moment to stim1, every missed deadline, every day of executive dysfunction,
everything. Credit attributed to everyone but me, but that’s the job. That’s the academy. In the
middle of a convention center in Baltimore, Maryland, I realize that this is the disabled rat race.

“Stimming” refers to the practice of fidgeting or playing with some sort of tool as a calming tool. It is
common among autistics.
1
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You cite everyone else to justify your existence until you write enough that someone is citing
you to justify their existence, and then the snake swallows its tail.
That realization is the one that becomes too much. I check my phone. There is nothing I
am scheduled to be at right this second, and I cannot spend another second dwelling on this. I go
and find lunch, deliberately avoiding contact with anyone who was in the session to prevent
more questions. Things come close to returning to normal, but I become painfully aware what
“normal” means in this context. This feeling, the frustration, the constant reference to others to
justify existing. I would later return to my room, still unsettled. People who were not in the room
will ask what the experience was like. I will lie to them, and say it was fun.
The irony of writing academic work in the context of disability partially comes from my
general discomfort with the ways in which academics are asked to explain themselves in the
form of citation, boiling dynamic identity down to easily-packaged academic referent. To this
end, Peruzzo (2020) asks “who is entitled to talk about disability,” arguing that direct experience
with disability is the primary indicator that one is qualified, so to speak, to competently theorize
the disabled position. Interestingly, Peruzzo goes on to argue that the non-disabled voice is
necessary in disability studies, “dwelled in a rather under-explored terrain in social sciences and
philosophy, swinging between epistemological rejections and ontological stances” (p. 33). In a
book shaped by the autoethnographic accounts of disabled folks, Peruzzo’s dual claim that
personal experience is a necessary wing of disability studies inquiry, while also declaring social
sciences “underexplored” underscores the crux of my discomfort, and ultimately, the cruelty of
the academic cudgel. The only interrogation that matters is interrogation that is justified through
the academy itself.
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The neoliberal push for production is key in that constraint. Pressures to constantly
publish papers, procure panels, present at conferences, finish classes, teach undergrads swiftly
turns the academy into just another workplace. After all, the academic that cannot produce,
cannot eat. However, when neoliberalism demands production in the context of the academy,
what is lost is the freeing work done by simple self-reflection. Neoliberalism, in its demand for
citable, transferable, publishable work, rewards blanket theorizing on the disabled condition,
regardless of the theorizing’s applicability to other disabled positionalities. Brown (2020) goes
even further, noting that such a demand not only flattens the means by which disabled folks
consider their lives in relation to the world, but entrenches “the working conditions as a
contemporary academic in the neoliberal university as a source of aggravation for their
symptoms'' (p. 67). Andrews (2020) and other autoethnographers attempt to intervene in the
construction of such conditions, by centering the individual experiences of disability as a
mooring point for analysis, with citation being simple support contextualizing a unique,
independent positionality.
This conundrum is what I refer to when I write that I am my own Other. While the paper
itself borrows the frameworks, words, and occasionally the questions of many academics in the
hopes of presenting a framework for understanding my own experience in academia, at the core
of the argument, I am theorizing from my future, and mine alone. There is no generalizable claim
to be had here, in which I utilize an amalgamation of other autoethnographers’ work to attempt
to universally encapsulate the lived experience of being disabled in the academy. To do so would
be to severely limit the range of analysis that can come from such a convoluted, complex,
contradictory, revelatory, and infuriating position. There is no singular disabled academic to
analyze. There is no universal answer to what is a disabled academic? There is no point on a grid
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at which “disabled” and “academic” meets that generates a discrete position with its own
properties, privileges, and oppressions. Instead, each academic is an assemblage of moments,
disabilities, experiences, and positions that creates a person. “The Literature'' cannot save us.
“The Literature'' cannot propose a magic solution to ableism within the academy. What “The
Literature'' offers is a means and a lens to add more context, for us to come to terms with the
assemblages we have been presented with. It is an unsatisfying purpose, at times. But it serves to
intervene in Othering by preventing the exact kind of behavior this paper claims that it does not
undergo in its introduction.
Conclusion
The futurity offered to disabled folks, autistics, and crips is not static, nor is it universally
applicable across any single category. Not every crip academic is asked to be a super-crip. Not
every academic has their agency stripped regarding when and how to disclose their disability.
Not every academic even feels as if the constant need for reference is stifling. Each of these
vignettes is a moment in which A Adams, an autistic crip who happens to be an academic, is
formed and reformed. Each moment is one part of a larger assemblage that makes a person. Each
moment is a scene of Othering, and some are scenes of overcoming. They are scenes of doubt,
dismay, and occasionally rhetorical violence. But in service of discovering a future for a disabled
academia, resistance to Othering provides a path.
A eugenic future is one in which disability cannot be imagined. For at least my presence
as it pertains to the academy, a disabled future is one in which I retain full control over my own
disability. I out myself when I please. I engage in work to the best of my abilities on my terms.
My identity exists outside of the confines of academic citation. A disabled future, in the direct
shadow of being Othered, simply means allowing me to be disabled. In the next chapter,
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however, the process of being disabled is interrupted by a current need on the road to a eugenic
future. In order to survive eugenic logics, one must not be disabled, and instead attempt to pass
as “normal,” whatever that means in a given moment.
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Chapter Five: Doing the Dance
Passing, in the context of this chapter, mostly refers to attempts I make to seem
neurotypical, or at least “less disabled.” What that actually means changes from moment to
moment, as the very purpose of passing as neurotypical is unstable, and is redefined in each
moment in which I engage with eugenic logics. In some cases, “passing” may not even refer to
trying to seem neurotypical. My identity is made least clear in these moments, as contextual
forces require me to either abandon, tone down, or overperform a central part of the assemblage
of identities that becomes A Adams. By understanding the means I utilize to pass, whatever that
means in a given moment, we better understand what facets of disability are and are not
acceptable, painting a clear picture of what a disabled future can look like.
“We Could Do the Work.”: Passing in Communal Contexts
Conferences are the worst thing ever created, and whoever came up with the idea should
be arrested. But they represent one of the few chances I get to interact with other folks interested
in disability, so I suck it up and attend them when I can afford it. Never, though, have I attended
this national conference. For some goofy reason, I elect to believe my academic friends when
they insist that conferences are a validating experience that will make me feel seen. It does not
take long for me to remember that the vast majority of my academic friends are white and
neurotypical. But by this point, I have already paid two months of rent to pay for membership,
registration, airfare, lodging, baggage, and food so it isn’t like I can just not go. Besides that, I
have a paper to present, neurotypical graduate program representatives to woo, and colleagues
from forensics to catch up with before I inevitably end up exhausted and go to bed early.
But most of all, I want to experience the Disability Issues caucus. At other conferences,
disability studies has largely been something shoehorned into some other sub- discipline that
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your average faculty member actually cares about, like rhetoric or health. Having combed
through the program, I settle on a roundtable discussion regarding the future of the discipline. Of
course, the fact that such a roundtable exists does not bode well for the field, but at the very least
it means like-minded academics, I imagine, to commiserate with regarding the lack of jobs, the
academy’s frustrating obsession with job production, and generally disablist administrations.
Settling in after watching a paper panel the timeslot before, I become aggressively aware
of the sheer whiteness of the academics in the room. Of course, I’d known how white disability
studies is; the invisibility of Black disability is something I’ve mulled over for years. But that’s
supposed to be a theoretical consideration, something to mention in a conversation to get
scattered murmurs of recognition or derision from people I do not know and will never meet
again. Instead, white academics appraise me from the very moment I walk into the room. I feel
less like a scholar, and more like a novelty. In a moment of panic, I scan the room for my friend,
who just finished presenting a paper, with no luck. She has another competitive paper panel to
present in, and has jogged off to prepare. While I am no extrovert, I am at least functional in
social situations, so I find myself a seat on the outer boundaries of the circle that the group has
made from chairs from around the room. Space for wheelchairs, walking aids, canes, motorized
mobility aids, service animals, and all sorts of accessibility tools is made without fuss, and I calm
down a bit. Of course the Disability Issues caucus would manage to find a space in which
everyone could fit comfortably.
Of course, that only would matter if I were comfortable. I am immediately on edge. A
kind Ph.D. student with Tourette’s has some harsh verbal tics, and I wince a few times at phrases
like “eat a dick” and “go fuck off; nobody likes you.” I clearly have much to work on regarding
internalized disablism. Nobody else seems fazed, however. The group treats one another as old
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friends, asking about career trajectories, new Ph.D. students, personal lives, and the occasional
giggle about the progression of the conference. A handful complain about the venue of next
year’s conference. Nobody likes the Midwest. Of course, none of these questions or comments
are directed at me. I am, obviously, an outsider. Deep breaths. Find the ball of pink fabric in my
laptop bag. Roll it in my hand a few times. Focus.
Once the idle chatter subsides, the actual roundtable begins. A kindly-looking older white
man calms the group down and calls the panel to order with a short statement about how glad he
is to see every face, old and new, in the circle. He introduces himself as the chair of a full-blown
Disability Studies program. I start, having had no idea such a department even existed. Everyone
else pays rapt attention. It occurs to me that this man must be some kind of legend in the field, a
mainstay in students’ theses and dissertations. I expect to become even more anxious, but that
doesn’t happen. We ease into conversation; while the content is largely grim, it is presented as a
chat between friends. It just so happens that the general gist of the chat is “the field is dying;
there are no tenure lines. I hope you all like contingent contracts and teaching basic courses.”
There are moments of levity, though. One woman mentions that our collective need for
the intense security of tenure-track positions is capitalism playing a nasty trick on our ability to
see our work as more than a path to a perfectly secure forever job. The comment makes sense to
me, but others seem skeptical. One professor comments on how she cannot believe that more of
the Ph.D. holders in the room aren’t being considered for tenure-track jobs.
I would like to believe that I have a functioning Spidey Sense for white nonsense, and it
was going off about as loud as it possibly could. Before the speaker even finishes her opening
comment, my nose starts to burn harshly, a tell-tale sign that something embarrassing is
forthcoming. I avert my eyes and instead look around at the other attendees. Some are nodding
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along; others are starting to look uncomfortable. I wonder, in this moment, how I must look in
comparison to the others. Thankfully, no eyes drift my way as I go to take a drink of the bottle of
water I have been nursing for four hours. A bottle I promptly choke on when the professor
finishes her argument.
“I mean, we all know we can do the race work anyway. I’d say a lot of us know it better
than the non-white people departments keep hiring for these postings, so we can be more
intersectional.”
It is all I can do to not make it too obvious that there is now water in my nose. I manage
not to hack or cough, but instead clear my throat in my little corner. Nobody looks comfortable,
save for the five or six vigorously nodding white people. One of them snaps along, like she is at
a spoken word performance. Black disability being invisible is suddenly seeming VERY
attractive, and so I wait for literally any white person to point out how patently absurd that
statement is. There are some half-hearted contradictions, mostly in the tone of “you shouldn’t say
that out loud.” Nothing is said along the lines of “that was wrong and wwack.” The group moves
on, and others manage to steer the conversation away from a woman determined to match every
Karen stereotype on the planet. The roundtable goes to questions just as I start to feel
comfortable enough to contribute, though, so I raise my hand in response to some comment or
another. I am ignored.
For the next fifteen minutes, my hand remains in the air, while white scholar after white
scholar after white scholar gets to ask two or three questions each. It becomes apparent after the
fifth minute that I am not the only one who notices. The kind graduate student makes eye contact
with me and shrugs. The department chair from before notices and grinds the conversation to a
half, demanding that I get to ask my question. A few respondents look sheepish, caught in the act
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of the very same Othering they were just complaining about. I try to recall the conversation I
wanted to respond to, explain my personal interest in autistic identity, and ask my question: “As
I’m sure many of you noticed, this room is very white. How am I supposed to navigate DS as a
Black person?”
Immediately my White Lady Bullshit detector starts working overdrive, even before the
words have sunk in enough for me to realize what I have just done. Immediately, I regret asking
anything, as Dr. Knows-The-Race-Work immediately launches into her answer as if it was
rehearsed. I, to this point, have never experienced someone so intent on becoming the villain of a
panel, but she goes for it. She insists that I will be fine, that Disability Studies isn’t that white.
Besides, I should feel lucky: institutions would love to hire an abled Black person who does
disability work, and I should have a massive leg up when applying for jobs.
The room, of course, explodes in dissent. The poor offending faculty member looks
proud of herself for saying something so brave. She gets a few agreeing nods, but most people
are clamoring to disagree. When things finally calm down a bit, a PhD in the back of the room
quietly responds to my original question: “I think you need to find your people. And asking
questions like that makes it really easy to figure out who they are.”
That comment ends the roundtable, having run five minutes longer than scheduled.
Faculty go back to chatting with friends. Graduate students send embarrassed looks in my
direction. The department chair gives me his business card, mildly apologetic about what just
happened. I mention that I am used to it. He tells me I shouldn’t have to be. We chat for a while
longer, mostly about my research interests and thesis plans, and then we go our separate ways. I
brood over a funnel cake for the next two hours, lamenting the fact that only about half of the
folks in that room saw me as someone who belonged.
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I do not go to another Disability Issues caucus panel for the rest of the conference, and
elect to skip watching them virtually in 2020.
The initial complication of my attempts at passing are clear: the very nature of
conferences means that I am generally conversing with people whom I have never met. As a
result, there is no meaningful history of previous interaction with me that would tip off the room
regarding any invisible disabilities. In addition, credibility is largely contextual, and one’s ability
to effectively participate in discussion regarding the future of disability studies is, as far as I was
concerned at the time, dependent on one’s experience with disability. After all, it would likely
not play well for an able-bodied researcher to lecture a room of disabled activists, students, and
faculty regarding the future of a field that uniquely involves them. As a result, the basis for any
consideration of my disability is disclosure, which comes with its own dangers. Brown (2020)
explains:
[...]Public disclosure brings further risks. Academics, specifically early-career
academics, worry about the consequences of being identified as someone dealing
with health issues and conditions. In an environment where temporary, as-andwhen contracts are more prevalent than permanent, tenured positions, employees
are concerned about job insecurity. Individuals fear that by admitting to health
conditions or disabilities they may be worsening their chances for employment.
(p. 61)
At a conference, disclosure develops a unique minefield to navigate. Within every moment in
which I disclose my disability, there are a host of potential PhD advisors, classmates, and
eventually possible employers who hear every word. While the nature of disability studies
sessions mitigate some of the potential harms, they still very clearly exist. The fact that the
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round-table was about the future of disability studies reinforces the very nature of the session:
this is a space in which career directions are to be considered first and foremost. That changes
the very terms of disclosure, and the role it plays in being recognized as disabled. Brown (2017)
goes on to describe the “disclosure dance” that is unique to academia, exacerbated by the culture
of overwork and the need for information management (p. 67). Academics must learn to navigate
their presence in neoliberal institutions that marketize and commodify their identities, and
identify their working conditions in relation to said identity.
In performing this dance, a cogent truth becomes evident: I am not trying to pass as
neurotypical in this particular space. Instead, I am tasked with passing as disabled. This is no
new phenomenon, as Griffiths (2020) notes: “as an academic with a non-visible disability, doing
disability research, a more open discussion about disability as experienced by academics was
required” (p. 126). Constant pressures to be the super-crip interact with the need for rest, often
flying in the face of stated desires to create a more accessible academy. Productivity, and its
relationship to the bodymind, takes center stage, regardless of attempts to curb the academy’s
neoliberal tendencies. Griffiths, to further this point, turns to the legal definition of disability, as
expressed in the Equality Act of 2010: “a physical or mental impairment that has a substantial
and long-term adverse effect on a person’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities” (p.
128). Under neoliberalism, “day-to-day activities” largely and simply means “work.” Production
is the core of what marks bodies as “disabled,” and the academy is not immune from that. In a
space in which “the work” is predicated on being disabled, it becomes necessary to externalize
any invisible disability, through disclosure or by other means.
Goodley (2018) expounds further, noting that paid labor often ends up central to identity
formation in the global north, as neoliberalism inevitably intervenes in self-construction. And as

47
ableism and neoliberalism interact, employment status and employability become irrefutable
markers of wholeness and success. As I attempted to navigate questions regarding future
employability, carving out room in professional institutions, and finding someplace for my work
to fit in, I must ensure that I am recognized as disabled. Brown (2020) argues that when
disability is invisible, disabled actors have the choice on whether to pass, disclose, or simply
conceal their disability. In contexts like these, that choice is complicated, and the definition of
passing becomes unstable. In that instability, agency and compulsion is called into question. In
academia, is disclosure for the sake of participating in one’s field a meaningful choice, or is it
simply the result of needing to set up a career? Without answers to these questions, disabled
folks in fields centering disability play a delicate balancing act in maintaining agency over their
identities, and disclosing enough to justify one’s research.
Such a conclusion leads us to the crux of the vignette and ultimately this chapter: am I
successfully passing as disabled? Given the extent to which my presence is ignored or
questioned, with little space in between, it would seem that I am not. However, given the unique
way that career-centered neoliberal institutions frame disability, I do end up passing. That just
happens to not necessarily be a benefit. I am confronted with the potential for coming out, but
with different dangers than anticipated. Disclosure in spaces explicitly not designed for disability
leaves the potential for undue labor, as I explain being on the spectrum to those who have not
spent much time thinking about autism at all. Here, though, I run the risk of needing to perform
more work in order to justify my disclosure. It is not enough to simply be disabled. It becomes
necessary to be “disabled enough,” so that the interests that I may introduce in casual
conversation are justified.
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Beyond that, any disclosure is immediately commodified and marketized. My
personhood is boiled down to my ability to secure a job in academia, as illustrated by the faculty
member declaring that getting a job will be easy. Suddenly, a question asked regarding
community and belonging gets turned into a career-focused question, as if I were primarily
interested in my career prospects. In the immediate aftermath of the question, I am no longer
simply a disabled graduate student with an interest in disability. First and foremost, I am a
candidate for employment, despite my question having nothing to do with employment.
Therefore, any and all inquiry into my place in Disability Studies must be filtered through
employment. In this framework, it makes perfect sense for Dr. Knows-The-Race-Work to focus
on my apparent ease in finding a job because I am Black. The market comes first, and it is my
job to pass as someone who can meet the market where it is. “Disabled” and “employable in
disability studies” end up going hand-in-hand, and while from an interpersonal standpoint, I
clearly do not fit in, I do present a presence that can be easily assimilated into that marketized
framework and commodified.
“So Why Do You Study This Stuff?”: Passing in Interrogation
The first thing I notice as I pull a chair towards the table in the cramped conference room
an entire graduate seminar shares, is that I have far more papers in front of me than everyone
else. Probably more papers than them combined. For what is supposed to be a session for
presenting final papers, I don’t see many papers that seem finalized. Or presentable. Actually, I
don’t see many papers at all. Just outlines. Immediately it becomes painfully apparent: it’s going
to be a very long night.
Internal calculus begins, a ritual weighing of my options and potential outcomes. Impact
calculus, cost-benefit analysis, and a few prayers to whatever higher power governs academia
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will dictate how to respond to a question I have come to abhor in informal paper presentations:
So who would like to present first?
I’ve done this dance before, and it isn’t a fun one. As an overzealous, newly-diagnosed
undergrad, I hadn’t learned the politics of presenting on the spectrum. I would volunteer to go
first, and inevitably the avalanche of questions would make that decision a bad one. What I
hadn’t figured out then is a crucial part of surviving academia. Everything has rules. And these
rules need to be followed to the letter. Failing to do so will result in an unnecessary defense of
my existence that will leave me ignoring my phone, homework, and emails to play Fire Emblem
on my laptop in the dark later that night. And so by the time this particular session has begun, the
rules have been internalized enough that breaking them isn’t even an option.
Rule number one: Never go first.
This is the most important rule. Seeming too eager to talk about an identity that most of
my colleagues see as a death sentence is a good way to be asked uncomfortable questions about
why I’m autistic, what happened at birth, or if I am sure that I am really on the spectrum. This
one is simple enough. It’s basically an extension of not answering every question in high school.
Minus, of course, the sitcom English teacher telling me not to mind The Cool Kids, and that I
should just be myself. Instead, the real-world English professor usually patiently waits for
literally anyone else to volunteer, and then sends me an email about dominating the class
discussion later. Or they forgo the email and admonish me for the sin of talking too much. Some
days I would honestly prefer getting stuffed into a locker. The neurotypical students avoid going
first, basically. So I should as well.
And so I wait, hand only sort of raised as a good-faith effort to seem engaged, but it’s not
really in the air. It’s a show. It’s all a show. The professor picks someone else to go first, and I
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heave a sigh of relief. The next step, though, is urgent. I retrieve my phone and thumb over to the
stopwatch app. In a notebook, I have written down how long each presentation is supposed to be.
In this case, ten to fifteen minutes, though this time also includes answering questions. This
range is lax, though, as there is more than enough time in the seminar for everyone to go over the
allotted amount of time. That doesn’t make the timer any more necessary, unless I want to
violate another ironclad rule.
Rule number two: Time everything.
As the first student introduces their paper, I keep notes on questions I want to ask. I write
out full questions in a notebook, estimating how long it will take me to write them out. Some
questions need explanations of what brought me to the question. Those are the most dangerous. I
leave those at the bottom of the notebook page. Others are simply logistical. How did you come
up with the topic? How did you decide on this framework? Ooooh, what do you mean by
assemblage? They’re all questions that are mostly answered in the presentations proper, but
they’re safe. They have very little chance of going on for too long, which is the primary goal
here. Years of dealing with neurotypical students have made me cynical, uncharitable in my
interpretation of responses. But more than that, I have become painfully aware of my tendencies.
I do not have a very good internal clock when I am speaking. I often have no clue for how long I
have been talking during a conversation, even when I have a script. And so everything needs to
be timed to the second, with a clean bailout plan if the comment or question drags on too long.
The first presentation ends in eight minutes and fifty seconds. Too short. But questions
can even out the presentation some, so I ask some of the longer questions I have set aside. An
extra five minutes are spent on questions clears that up. Mission accomplished. It occurs to me
that what I just listened to was less a paper and more an outline. The professor doesn’t seem
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angry or upset, which seems strange to me. The syllabus very clearly states that today is for
presenting papers. Outlines are not papers. It occurs to me that I don’t really know how I will get
through 30 pages of information in ten minutes. I find myself running headlong into the third
rule.
Rule number three: Stay flexible.
The next few presentations reinforce what I learned from the first. Maybe “final paper
presentations” did not actually mean presenting final, finished papers. It occurs to me that I have
taken an arbitrary line in a syllabus far too literally, and put myself in a bad spot because of it. I
try to do a good job of never feeling ashamed of being autistic, but in this moment I am feeling
it. But part of being flexible is rolling with the embarrassing moments. The correct option here is
to simply distill the paper to its base elements, referring to the outline that I wrote months ago to
walk everyone through my thought process. The content, clearly, is not as important as the
process. This presentation is a progress report, a week before the final paper is due. I could talk
about why I selected the framework divisions I wrote about. I could talk about how this paper is
a launching point for a thesis I am planning on writing. I could talk about the inspiration I drew
from the professor’s own book. I could talk about needing to draw from other disciplines in order
to write about autism because our own literature base sucks.
I do none of those things. I double down instead.
I explain the entire paper in painstaking detail. In my panic, I have forgotten to start the
stopwatch. I read facial expressions to determine when I should move on. I occasionally glance
at the time to loosely measure where I am. I skip entire sections when I lose track of time. I
spend three minutes on a single citation because it’s just so fascinating and it has so many
implications for ways that our discipline can rectify its problem with autism research and it’s
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such an interesting way to apply the theory work we’ve read in this class and that’s why autism
functions as identity and suddenly it’s been twenty minutes and everyone has a billion questions.
A billion is too many questions. The first one is from another graduate assistant. She is one of
my closest friends in the department.
“Wait, so you’re autistic? That’s so cool that you can write this stuff.”
I have decided that I do not know this woman. Moving on.
The marathon session of questions is suffocating. I keep my head above water, but I feel
the tell-tale burning in the bridge of my nose, along with the dizzying brightening of the lights.
My eyes hurt. My head hurts. My hands are shaky. Breathing steadily is hard. This conference
room is way too small. Whose idea was it to have a class in here? Whose idea was this
presentation session? Why did I leave all of my stim tools at home? I want to put my head down,
but I have questions to answer, so I suck it up and just deal with it. My answers become sloppy,
and I need to consult the paper that I know back and forth to answer basic questions. I stop
recording useful lines of questioning that could cause me to change parts of the paper.
Suggestions for new citations get ignored. Canned answers to canned questions reinforce my
cynicism.
Eventually, a loud sniffle punctuates a hand shooting into the air. I would prefer the hand
go back onto the table, but I imagine I have one more answer in me before I really can’t do this
anymore. I compose myself, and shuffle papers around before calling on the graduate student, a
man a year ahead of me working on his own thesis. He clears his throat and begins with a
compliment.
“First, that was a really good presentation. I couldn’t even tell that you are autistic. So
why do you study this stuff?”

53
An hour later, I am at home, sitting on my bed in my underwear. The lights are off, and
the papers I have just finished presenting have been thrown at the wall, and lie in a corner held
together by a bent staple. The soft blue light of the Fire Emblem title screen lights the corner
where I sit. The sound is off.
The paper will be turned in a week from now, with no edits from the night it was
presented.
Navigating the actual processes of academic spaces while disabled is a well-covered
subject of inquiry, often in the form of autoethnographic exploration of being disabled as a
faculty member. Finesilver, Leigh, and Brown (2020) explore a list of considerations disabled
academics must make in determining the accessibility of a space: pain (how much access would
hurt now), energy (how much energy the subject has to spend for access), and time (how long
securing access may take). Each consideration is cumulative, and conclusions are rarely static.
Considerations for access are just as applicable to the classroom, as each and every moment in
the classroom requires a constant evaluation of the potential consequences for engagement with
abled folks. Coming to incorrect conclusions about the reasonability of engagement often has
painful, or at least frustrating, consequences, making constant reconsideration necessary. Taken
further, these considerations make up many of the “rules” that Ferris (2008) insists are arbitrary.
In many cases, they are. They vary from situation to situation, and the exact same process
performed scores of times before (like presenting a paper) may suddenly shift into being a
massive burden without warning, simply because of small contextual forces changing.
Take, for instance, the short interaction with the “close friend.” Upon realizing that
explaining my interest is, in fact, an act of disclosure, it is my call whether to press on with a
detailed reconstruction of my paper. The conclusion I come to is that the moment itself will be
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painful, but short. And I assumed, in the moment, I had energy for most questions. Absent from
my conclusion is a prediction that I would be functionally interrogated for my positionality. The
actual content of the interrogation is not as important as the fact that it happens. The first
question asked is not one that is asking for an answer at all, in fact. It is simply voicing and
confirming what I have divulged: that I am Other. It is also confirmation that attempts thus far to
pass as neurotypical have been successful to some extent. Followed immediately is the real meat
of the interrogation, though it isn’t phrased as a question: That’s so cool that you can write this
stuff.
A distinction is being drawn between the rest of the course and I. I can “write this stuff”
because I am disabled. Those who are not disabled cannot “write this stuff,” in comparison. As a
statement of ethics, I likely would agree with that. However, I find myself annoyed anyway.
Disability, from my seat, seems to be getting boiled down to a pass to write about “cool” subject
matter, as if disability was purely aesthetic rather than a meaningful part of a larger assemblage
that generates a person. But I know that there are marked differences between the rest of the
class and I. After all, what is disability but embodied difference? But, for some reason, the fact
that questions are being asked after disclosure frustrate me in the immediate moments following
the presentation. Leigh and Brown (2020) provide some explanation: “By underwriting a
disability, the academic has to be confident and comfortable with identifying as a disabled
person. This might change from moment to moment [...]” (p.175). While I may have been fine
with “blowing my cover,” so to speak, before the initial questions, being pressed on the
perceived benefits of disability, while being not-so-covertly complimented on my ability to pass
is deeply uncomfortable. Again, disability is commodified, turned into a pass instead of a part of
who I am. As a result, my comfort with identifying as a disabled person shifts. McIntire (2012)
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explains further, using race as a centering concept: “racial difference inevitably relies on
assumptions that are ajar: race [...] is a figure that can never be decoded once and for all” (p.
779). Applied to disability, a similar confrontation occurs. Neurodivergence will always require
reliance on positionalities that are constantly shifting. A subject who is willing to disclose one
moment may revert to passing as neurotypical in the next. What may be deemed as “good”
passing may be negated by shifting cultural contexts, new information, or simply a lapse in
behavior. Attempts at universally defining what “passing” may look like outside of individual
moments in time serve to collapse definitions and expressions of disability. Assumptions
regarding disability are “ajar,” making it a figure that similarly cannot be decoded once and for
all.
The second moment of interrogation, however, dispenses with attempts at subtlety and
illustrates the depths of attempts to pass. Instead of simply hinting at my passing, like the first
interrogator, the second just outright says it. “I couldn’t even tell that you are autistic.” In
moments like these, disabled folks are reminded exactly what abled people think of when they
imagine disability. Rather than embodied difference, abled folks think of disability as embodied
impairment. Returning to my earlier argument: this is another example of academia’s need to
define disability. Collapsing autism into marked impairment is a stark and obvious continuation
of the eugenic logics that the paper I attempted to present challenged. Again, there is no future in
which A Adams is not visibly autistic. Any moment in which I “hide” my disability is one worth
commending. Problematizing such a response is, frankly, not very hard. At its core, the
“compliment” is simple: it is impressive that I manage to not seem too much like the other
disabled folks. Confronted in other frameworks, the comment is no different than “you’re so
eloquent” expressed to Black folks who do not speak in African American Vernacular English.
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In service of a eugenic future, one in which disability “does not exist,” one of the simplest ways
to evade the inevitable erasure that eugenic logics produce is to simply engage in said erasure
beforehand. Beating futurity to the punch and passing as “normal” allows for largely seamless
movement through spaces largely designed to weed out disabled folks.
The moment of the second interrogation serves a larger purpose to reinforce, as GarlandThomson (2017) describes, “this literalizing of disability as disqualification…the master trope of
the shared world” (p. 53). Being disabled, even in a small compliment like the one presented,
should be disqualifying in presenting a good paper. Going further, comments like these reveal a
larger implication: being disabled should be disqualifying in engagement with academia as a
whole. Regardless of a larger focus on disability studies, surprise that an autistic student can
produce academic work only makes sense if I am violating some larger arbitrary rule of
academia. The very real symptoms of various disabilities are read as not only impairment, but
active hindrance in the disabled subject’s participation in the academy. For the most part, this is
not necessarily problematic. Brown (2020) notes that construction of academic identity includes
the physical, felt, and embodied manifestations of disability. The pain and fatigue associated
with fibromyalgia, Brown writes, very clearly impact the scholar and what they may perform.
They are real setbacks. Similarly, I cannot simply ignore the impact that overstimulation and the
exhaustion that follows has on my performance. They are a part of what makes a disabled
academic. The issue comes with the reading of disability as disqualifying for academic work,
rather than the disability itself.
Here, I would like to disentangle this analysis from the social model of disability. I am
not arguing that it is the work of the academic that disables the academic. For many disabled
folks, including myself, our symptoms exist outside of the context of the logics that define them.
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I would be no less autistic even in a future that embraces disability. My neurology does not
simply change because the academy procures better means of securing access. It is not the
environment that makes me autistic, but my brain. However, this is not contradictory to the
argument that disability is exacerbated by reading disability as disqualification. Existing
symptoms and performances of those symptoms are routinely punished by the constant
movement of academia. Goodley (2018) argues that the academy “norms” ability, flagrantly
ignoring the very presence of disability in its constant desire to standardize learning. Educational
success, Goodley writes, is framed through individual achievement, and when disability
interferes with the “right kind” of achievement (publications, presentation of research, and
administrative service) it is discarded as a hindrance, further disadvantaging the disabled scholar.
Inheriting participation within a project that was never intended to not be eugenic naturally
generates spectacle both when the disabled scholar meets and fails to meet expectation.
Ultimately, this dynamic makes any and all attempts at passing in this moment moot.
When I succeed, it is used as a notable departure from disabled disqualification. I am succeeding
in spite of my disability, per the eugenic structure, as opposed to alongside it. When I fail to pass,
it simply reinforces larger eugenic beliefs about the limitations of disability. But even those
assumptions are complicated. Disability does come with limitations. There are clearly defined
limits to the amount of stressful social interaction I can engage in before I need a break. There
are very clearly defined consequences for pushing my limit for stimulation too far. There are
significant barriers to communicating in groups and presentations when I struggle to read social
cues or facial expressions. My lack of an internal clock to measure how long I have been
speaking plays a significant role in my ability to manage presentations. All of these are
limitations that simple “inclusion” does not necessarily fix. Reimagining an academia in which
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passing is no longer commendable does not erase the impact of moments in which I cannot pass.
Those moments just are, with no meaningful value statement one way or another. I am not
inspirational for simply existing. I am not tragic when I just barely manage to exist. In my own
Otherness, I just am. Passing is just one strategy adopted to end interrogations before they begin,
and even that does not always work.
Conclusion
Exploring the means by which I pass as disabled, neurotypical, Black, and just “normal”
illustrates a key truth about my time in the academy: under the eugenic present, I cannot “be
myself.” There is no disabled future for someone who cannot be disabled. On the other hand,
there cannot be a meaningful future for A Adams, disabled academic, if performance of
disability exists only for the purpose of getting a job. Resigning my identity to a neoliberal
framework that, at times, even exacerbates the symptoms of disability (Brown, 2020), does not
lead to a future in which disability is recognizable outside of neoliberalism. In those moments, as
mentioned before, I am not disabled. I am simply the candidate for a job. A disabled future
rejects these frameworks, and allows for an assemblage of difference to define disability. This is
just one disabled future, but it is one in which A Adams no longer has to pass as anything. I just
get to be. A disabled future is one in which disability not only exists, but gets to exist upon its
own definitions and expressions, not through performances for the purpose of obtaining and
preserving capital.
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Chapter Six: Towards a Neuroqueer Utopia
These vignettes presented earlier do not come close to encapsulating the entirety of what
it means to be autistic, nor do they even encapsulate all of what it means to be A. Adams, autistic
graduate student. There is no larger point to derive about the lived experiences of other crips that
fundamentally reshapes how we understand ourselves. However, there are a few lessons that
stem from my experiences here.
First, academia is disablist. In each scenario, I am confronted with a eugenic ethic that
infiltrates even the most well-meaning professors and students. Without consistent access to
material that intentionally integrates crip academics on a practical and theoretical level, any
attempt to engage the academy is doomed to replicate eugenic logics. Even for students, never
considering the existence of disabled classmates is not simply a failure of their instructors. At
some point, should a disabled future come to exist, it becomes necessary to hold students
accountable for their reactions to the people around them. It is not incumbent upon disabled folks
and crips to teach abled folks how to not be disablist. It is instead their own responsibility to
utilize the wealth of resources available to them in order to better themselves. Ethics aside,
teaching abled folks all day is exhausting. Much of the exhaustion experienced in the aftermath
of any of these anecdotes comes entirely from the very idea that I would have to catch other
academics up on how not to be disablist, which is clearly a daunting task.
Second, performance is exhausting. Each of these anecdotes are simply reflections of
what happened in one moment on one day of a currently twenty-four year-long life. Having to
navigate conferences and defend my very presence though citation is uniquely draining. To do
this every single day for twenty-four years is to engage in a performance that subsumes the self
in a variety of contexts that were selected for me. I never get to decide, by myself, what autism is
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or what it does. I only get to exist, and there are situations in which it becomes apparent that
abled folks would prefer that I didn’t. If “difference” is what defines autism, rather than simple
neurology, then there is truly no point in pretending that there is a form of performance that can
be understood by neurotypical folks. It’s “different” all the same. Attempts to mitigate the effort
that goes into simply living also just happen to require a lot of work. Passing as disabled in a
career-development space that requires hyper-visibility is a full-time job. Passing as non-disabled
in order to simply finish assignments is similarly exhausting, forcing an unfortunate double-bind.
Passing is exhausting, but navigating academia while constantly disclosing is just as tiring,
frustrating, and ultimately unsustainable.
Finally, narrative isn’t meant to be understood by outside actors. None of the vignettes
here are meant to be relatable, or even intelligible. If the only way to understand performances
from the margins is to collapse all marginalized existence into one easy-to-digest performance
script, then we are simply incapable of understanding or respecting the myriad oppressions faced
by marginalized bodyminds across the spectrum of human existence. What constitutes a utopian
future shifts and changes from position to position. What constitutes survival changes from
position to position. In some spaces, remaining quiet does “enough.” In other moments,
challenging a professor’s comments might work. Otherwise, removing myself from a conference
environment provides a band-aid. However, these acts are all simply band-aids. What is rendered
visible, invisible, harmful, helpful, tiring, or empowering shifts in each moment, from each
position, and between each person. Ultimately, the processes by which disabled folks engage in
resistance to eugenic logics, and the worlds they build, shift rapidly and constantly from person
to person. I have no expectation for another disabled academic to read this paper and come to the
conclusion that I am “just like them.” However, if any single person reads this account and it
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makes the process of navigating the eugenic world in which we live a little easier, then this
analysis has done its job.
For me, resistance to eugenic world building runs central to the utopian futurity that
enables disability to continue existing. Introduced by Garland-Thomson (2017), eugenic world
building refers to a process “which strives to eliminate disability and, along with it, people with
disabilities from human communities through varying social and material practices that range
from seemingly benign to egregiously unethical” (p. 52). Such a project takes on many forms,
from genetic manipulation, the desire to find a cure for autism, and restrictive environments
segregating off disabled people, to simply enforcing medical normalization in the hopes of
reducing human suffering. The elimination of devalued human traits lies at the center of the
eugenic world, and a future in which those traits vanish is a eugenic one.
The world in which we live, and the future to which we are heading simply does not want
disabled people in it. Both the academy I work and study in, and the one I am looking to remain
in long-term simply does not willingly offer space for us. Like any marginalized positionality,
space is carved out from the margins to play in a structure not built to accommodate us, but
stealing space does not change the structure itself. This is the reality that I run headlong into in
every vignette. Being present in a meeting does not mitigate the disablism of those running the
meeting. My presence in a classroom does not magically make the classroom a less hostile space
for an autistic academic. Every moment spent in the academy reminds that I am a mere visitor,
an invader from the margins destined to be sent back as soon as I cannot produce. I exist on
borrowed time, as neoliberalism demands that I continue to borrow and produce to pay my debts.
In that sense, the eugenic world building project is well underway, and these vignettes serve little
purpose besides a grim reminder of the trajectory my career and life are on. Eugenic logics tell us
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that the world immediately becomes better the moment disability is eradicated. Meanwhile, my
experiences in the academy tell me that my graduate career would be better if my autism were
cured. To paraphrase Garland-Thomson’s core question regarding eugenic logics: Why, the logic
asks, would the academy we learn in together have disability at all? The academy ends up being
the very embodiment of the eugenic future.
Unchecked, these logics become futures. The world building will finish eventually, and
we arrive at a time without disability. Maybe that doesn’t necessarily mean killing off every
disabled person. Maybe that just means disabled scholars quit the academy, realizing it doesn’t
want us. Maybe it means disabled scholars try so hard to pass as abled, the academy forgets we
are disabled. We fold ourselves into the academic mainstream, assimilating to survive. We end
up inhabiting the marked identity of the neoliberal citizen, per Goodley (2014): willing, capable,
and able(d). We perform to an excellent standard, producing publications, performance, syllabi,
conference presentations, and all without needing accommodation. Or, if not needing
accommodation is not possible, we simply don’t ask. The eugenic logic does not care for how
disability vanishes. It simply asks that it vanish.
To contest this future, I turn to queer theory, and the utopian futures proposed by queer
studies scholars to reclaim the potential of queerness in an anti-queer world. Muñoz (2009)
introduces the “queer utopian memory,” a critique of the present shaped by an incessant desire to
fit into structures built to reject queerness. Aspects of an uncertain past crystallize in the form of
desire from the modern queer, leading Muñoz to conclude that we are not yet “queer.”
Queerness, then, is a future. A potential. An ideality, build from a utopia that has not arrived,
contesting the anti-queer utopia generated by the present. Muñoz argues that queer itself is a
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mode of desiring that embraces the future, rending the present a prison. Noss (2012) expands the
argument, writing:
The notion of Utopia brings its own temporal challenges and inspirations. The
recent debate over futurity within queer theory implies a renewed interest in
utopianism, which appears at first blush to be a staunchly humanist project. At the
front lines of this conversation Lee Edelman has argued that queerness is
precisely the refusal of reproductive futures that have never considered the lives
of homosexuals; queerness for Edelman must be the disruptive force against the
future and identity itself. (p. 131)
At the core of queer futurity is an acknowledgement that rejection of reproductive futures
enables a queer utopia in which the ideality of queerness is realized. If the world as it exists has
never taken queerness into account, then why engage? Instead, the utopian argument goes, the
queer project must become disruptive, interrupting the processes by which the present captures,
reforms, and eliminates queerness. The prison must be more than simply escaped, but disrupted
and destroyed. A future designed “for the children'' must, after all, be one devoid of queerness. In
the meantime, we wait on the arrival of the queer utopia by rejecting “hetero-supremacy,” or the
ideology that necessitates that even queer folks evade accusation of propagating the “gay
agenda,” and assimilate into the larger anti-queer population (Conrad, 2014).
Applied to disability, a disabled utopian futurity becomes possible. Considering the
connections between the metaphorical prison of the anti-queer present, and the limiting nature of
the eugenic present generates a clear bridge between queerness and disability. The connection is
one borne of necessity, not relation. There is no easily-swallowed direct connection that answers
“what makes neurodiversity queer?” Instead, the connection is built through the threats of the

64
status quo. A eugenic future is strikingly similar to an anti-queer one. The future is designed for
the ableds, and therefore there is no place for autistic folks in it. We are, in the end, Othered. The
status quo simply demands that the Other cease to exist, regardless of the methods by which our
vanishing occurs. Interrogating this connection, Egner (2019) explores the concept of
“neuroqueer,” a project in which neurodivergent individuals engage to “disidentify from both
oppressive dominant and counterculture identities that perpetuate destructive medical discourse
models of cure” (p. 123), resisting a larger desire by a eugenic present to pathologize every part
of our bodyminds, from gender to sexuality to autism. As a politic, neuroqueer exists to
encapsulate those in the margins, consigned there for eventual elimination by eugenic futures.
Our disappearance, though, only happens to the extent that disability goes quietly into the night,
so to speak. Similarly to how Muñoz calls queer an ideality, neuroqueer inhabits the same space.
I argue that neuroqueer has not happened yet. Challenges to the boundaries of binary
definitions of “crippled” and “normal” contextualize the neuroqueer project, but in the context of
a logic built purely to eliminate disability, the project seeks to generate a new future not yet
realized. Preserving existence is central in the neuroqueer project, justifying the connection.
Egner explains: “neuroqueer is a queer/crip response to normative discussions about gender,
sexuality, and disability as pathology” (p. 124). The rejection of eugenic logics, then, allows for
the advent of a disabled, neuroqueer future in which a utopia is realized. Again, if the eugenic
world, as built, does not consider disability, nor provide access, why engage? Rejection of
demands to pass, demands to produce, demands to succeed as the neoliberal worker consolidates
into a neuroqueer futurity that enables a world in which disability is allowed to exist. This future
is prevented, then, to the extent to which disabled bodies can be policed, so that disability ceases
to exist. Each moment in which the eugenic logic is not rejected, then, is one in which it is
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reinforced. As a result, the neuroqueer project cannot arrive until eugenic logics are resisted.
Once harmful medical models are rejected, neoliberal demands on the disabled body are resisted,
and the disabled academic is simply allowed to be, the neuroqueer project generates a future in
which we exist. Ultimately, this is what answers our research question: A disabled future in
academia is one in which the bodymind matters. A neuroqueer futurity allows for a disabled
academia to flourish, in which disability is no longer disqualification. Disability becomes simply
the bodymind existing in difference.
Disengaging from eugenic logics upends the experiences presented in the vignettes.
When disability is no longer disqualifying, disability no longer needs a cure of any sort. Instead,
disability is simply allowed to be. Access remains an important project, but it does not remain
the end-all regarding disabled existence and movement. Possibly most importantly, a neuroqueer
future disidentifies with neoliberalism. The prevailing notion that bodies must produce in order
to generate value runs intrinsically counter to the future this thesis attempts to propose. In doing
so, a utopian neuroqueer future challenges the social model. Even in a world in which everything
is perfectly accessible, disability still exists. Even in a world in which there is no disablism in
academia, I am still autistic, and that still meaningfully impacts the way I think, speak, and
experience. It is just no longer disordered.
This realization comes with some reflections regarding my presence in the academy. In
particular, my attempts at passing provide key context to the ways in which eugenic logics
reproduce to eliminate disability. As mentioned before, a eugenic future does not need to cure
disability to eliminate it. Disability simply needs to be folded into the mainstream. Assimilation
of disabled bodyminds, as with queer futurity, generates a future in which there is no neuroqueer
presence, fulfilling the goal of the eugenic world building process. Every moment in which I

66
pass, I elect to punt on rejecting eugenic practices for the sake of convenience. As I recall each
moment writing this thesis, I am forced to confront a core truth regarding my presence in the
academy: my attempts at survival have reinforced the very structures I set out to critique.
When confronted with the ability to force the issue and demand instructors consider
disability more pointedly, I punt on the decision. Pressing the issue can be left for another day,
another paper, another conference, another meeting. This is the formative demand of
neoliberalism and the academy. If I am to live, I need to work. If I am to work, I need to
eventually be employed. If I am to be employed, I need to not rock the boat too much. As a
result, when a white attendee of a panel declares herself an expert on “the race work,” whatever
that means, the most I can do is join in on the chorus of unsure murmurs of dissent. When
confronted by classroom structures that do not consider disability, rather than actively challenge
the structure, I am asked instead to just “persevere,” whatever that means. Disablist
conversations go unquestioned, and attempts to pass remain preserved. The trick to “surviving”
academia is to simply not be disabled, even if I have a disability. Put simply, the trick to survival
is to not survive.
Returning to the central metaphor that birthed “passing,” Larsen’s (1929) novel Passing
ends with the protagonist being discovered as Black, despite passing as white. The realization is
followed by her death. This is the fundamental result of attempting to pass. Eventually, the
facade fails, and the logics that make passing a functional strategy for survival win out. The
passing offender is eliminated, and the racist, eugenic, homophobic, queerphobic logics that
eliminate the subject continue on, unabated. In the context of academia, this is where I can
illustrate the stakes of a eugenic future. A future in which there is no disability is one in which
eugenic logics have prevailed. Even if we simply reframe disability as “an issue with society” as
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opposed to “an embodied existence,” I do real damage to a future in which disabled folks exist in
attempting to hide disability. After all, why account for material oppression of disabled folks
when just building a ramp in a few places works? Why make meaningful efforts to change
academia when nobody’s really disabled, and we can just treat everyone the same? This is the
functional endgame of attempting to pass. It is an act, at its heart, designed to placate abled,
neurotypical folks.
This is no fun recognition, but autoethnography offers a method of self-reflexivity that is
often not easy, nor is it comfortable. In each vignette, an argument can be made for the necessity
of attempts to pass. Each moment in which I stay quiet in the face of being Othered can be
explained. Each time friends, advisors, and colleagues interact with disability, I have the choice
to stand my ground or simply retreat. However, when retreat is safe, what damage do I do to
myself? How much can I actually resist eugenic logics when I simply pretend they do not apply
to me whenever I am approached by the forces I critique here? Ultimately, my attempts to
survive the demands of eugenic neoliberalism recreate the neurotypical neoliberal subject the
academy demands.
These realizations are in no way meant to be applied at large, of course. Again, I am my
own Other, and any autoethnographic account of approaching the neuroqueer future pertains to
my own career and life. Given my continued interest in the academy, I do not believe these will
be my last brushes against our eugenic prison in the present. I am not convinced I will
necessarily respond in the moment in some astoundingly different way, simply because of the
analysis done here. My time in academia will always be contextualized by the legacy of ableism
and eugenics that follows disability. Politicizing the moments in which I confront that legacy is
simply one step in a larger shift towards a future in which disability matters. I refuse to allow
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myself to be handwaved as being “more than (just) a disability.” I am disabled. I am autistic. I
am neuroqueer, and a part of the neuroqueer project.
A purely social model that frames my existence through accessibility and external
structures could never approach a nuanced understanding of A Adams, autistic academic. Such a
model subsists only until cosmetic attempts at providing accessibility are made, at which point
disability functionally ceases to exist. Meanwhile, the phenomenological and embodied
“difference” remains. Universities having disability resource centers does not magically cure
autism, nor would I want it to. Instead, focusing on the ways in which embodiment impacts realworld living, even with accessibility measures attempted, provides a more complete description
of what autism does to and for me.
Being on the spectrum has made existing in academia difficult. As a space dedicated to
neurotypicals, the things I do and feel are often treated as unfortunate byproducts of a disordered
mind, or ignored altogether. Finding ways to accommodate my diagnosis in class is difficult, but
it is a process that I’ve practiced for over seven years, since I got my diagnosis. Being a part of
Facebook groups dedicated to autistic folks who also did speech, appearing in videos and
podcasts to talk about the intersection between autism and race, engaging with disability studies
work, and writing this thesis were all parts of a larger journey to figure out how to identify
myself. I feel a deep connection with being autistic. It’s why I use identity-first language to
describe myself. The idea that my brain is different, but not worse, matches what I think of
myself. It violates what I feel academia (as a weird, formless, living entity) “thinks.” It reinforces
the notion that I am a complete, whole person who can resist ableism. And it reinforces a
connection I feel to other autistic folks. Our brains are different from neurotypicals’ in some
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similar ways, but also in ways that I may never understand. In that difference is where I carved
out my social position.
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